We study the effect of a change in property rights on employee behavior in the financial advice industry. Our identification comes from staggered firm-level entry into the Protocol for Broker Recruiting, which waived nonsolicitation clauses for advisor transitions among member firms, effectively transferring ownership of client relationships from the firm to the advisor. After the shock, advisors appear to tend to client relationships more by investing in client-facing industry licenses, shifting to fee-based advising, and reducing customer complaints. Our findings support property rights based investment theories of the firm and document offsetting costs to restricting labor mobility.

中文翻译：

---

客户关系的产权和财务顾问奖励

我们研究了产权变化对金融咨询行业员工行为的影响。我们的识别来自交错的公司级别进入经纪人招聘协议，该协议免除了成员公司之间顾问转换的非征求条款，有效地将客户关系的所有权从公司转移到顾问。震惊之后，顾问似乎更倾向于通过投资面向客户的行业许可证、转向收费咨询和减少客户投诉来维护客户关系。我们的研究结果支持基于产权的公司投资理论，并记录了限制劳动力流动的抵消成本。