This paper argues that the European Union’s Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has improved market discipline in the European bank market for unsecured debt. The different impact of the BRRD on bank bonds provides a quasi-natural experiment that allows us to study the effects of the BRRD within banks using a difference-in-difference approach. Identification is based on the fact that (otherwise identical) bonds of a given bank maturing before 2016 are explicitly protected from BRRD bail-in. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that debt holders actively monitor banks and that the BRRD diminished bailout expectations after its enactment. Bank bonds subject to BRRD bail-in carry a 13-basis points bail-in premium in terms of the yield spread, driven by low capitalization. Banks that respond to market pressure by de-risking their portfolios are able to secure cheaper funding for instruments that are subject to bail-in.

本文认为，欧盟的银行业复苏和处置指令(BRRD) 改善了欧洲银行市场的无担保债务市场纪律。BRRD 对银行债券的不同影响提供了一个准自然实验，使我们能够使用差异中的差异方法研究 BRRD 在银行内的影响。识别基于这样一个事实，即特定银行在 2016 年之前到期的（其他相同的）债券受到明确保护，不受 BRRD 纾困。实证结果与债务持有人积极监控银行以及 BRRD 颁布后降低救助预期的假设一致。受BRRD自救的银行债券有13个基点的自救溢价在收益率差方面，受低资本化驱动。通过降低其投资组合的风险来应对市场压力的银行能够为受内部纾困的工具获得更便宜的资金。