Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
How Should E-Commerce Platforms Subsidize Retailers with Logistics Constraints during an Epidemic Scenario? Considering Power Structure and Altruistic Preference
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research ( IF 5.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-22 , DOI: 10.3390/jtaer16050095
Yang Zhang , Bing Xu

To maintain the sustainable development of a platform’s economy, e-commerce platforms put forward various subsidy programs to retailers selling on them during COVID-19. This paper investigates an e-commerce platform’s decision on subsidizing a retailer selling on it with logistics constraints during an epidemic scenario, with a focus on the role of power structure and altruistic preference. By constructing two Stackelberg game models, the research obtains the optimal subsidy under two power structures (i.e., the dominant platform and the weaker platform), respectively. The comparison between them shows that the conditions of the dominant platform giving subsidies (both altruistic preference and logistics constraints should be higher enough) are stricter than the weaker platform. Considering the same altruistic preference and logistics constraints, the optimal subsidy provided by the weaker platform should always be not less than the dominant platform. However, the weaker platform, surprisingly, can get more utility by lowering its altruistic preference voluntarily when the commission fee is low. No matter what the power structure is, the optimal subsidy increases with the logistics service coefficient and altruistic preference, and the dominant member’s profit/utility is not less than the weaker one, which confirms “the first mover advantage”. Finally, more managerial implications to the platform-retailer systems are discussed.

中文翻译:

在流行情况下,电子商务平台应如何为零售商提供物流约束补贴?考虑权力结构和利他偏好

为了维持平台经济的可持续发展,电子商务平台向COVID-19期间在其上销售商品的零售商提出了各种补贴计划。本文研究了一个电子商务平台在流行情况下补贴物流受限的零售商的补贴的决策,重点是权力结构和利他偏好的作用。通过构建两个Stackelberg博弈模型,本研究分别获得了两种权力结构(即优势平台和劣势平台)下的最优补贴。两者之间的比较表明,主导平台给予补贴的条件(利他偏好和物流约束都应足够高)要比弱者平台严格。考虑到相同的利他偏好和后勤约束,较弱的平台提供的最佳补贴应始终不小于主导平台。但是,令人惊讶的是,当佣金低时,较弱的平台可以通过自愿降低其利他主义偏好来获得更多效用。无论权力结构是什么,最优补贴都会随着物流服务系数和利他主义偏好的增加而增加,并且优势成员的利润/效用不低于弱者,这证明了“先发优势”。最后,讨论了对平台零售商系统的更多管理意义。无论权力结构是什么,最优补贴都会随着物流服务系数和利他主义偏好的增加而增加,并且优势成员的利润/效用不低于弱者,这证明了“先发优势”。最后,讨论了对平台零售商系统的更多管理意义。无论权力结构是什么,最优补贴都会随着物流服务系数和利他主义偏好的增加而增加,并且优势成员的利润/效用不低于弱者,这证明了“先发优势”。最后,讨论了对平台零售商系统的更多管理意义。
更新日期:2021-05-22
down
wechat
bug