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Stopping the Violence but Blocking the Peace: Dilemmas of Foreign-Imposed Nation Building After Ethnic War
International Organization ( IF 8.2 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-21 , DOI: 10.1017/s0020818321000266
Kevin Russell , Nicholas Sambanis

Can third parties build nations after ethno-sectarian war? We provide a positive theory of peace building that highlights trade-offs that are inherent in any foreign intervention, narrowing the conditions for success even when interventions are well resourced and even-handed. A “sectarian” dilemma arises because peace must rely on local leaders, but leaders who earned their reputations through ethno-sectarian conflict have no incentive to stop playing the ethnic card and will not provide public goods. Intervention can shift those incentives if it stops ethnic violence and rebuilds state institutions. But an “institutional” dilemma arises if intervention crowds out local leaders, limiting state legitimacy and constraining the pace with which state building unfolds. The window for a lengthier, slower pace of foreign-led state building will close due to its own success as the population switches from ethnic to national identification, creating a “sovereignty” dilemma that pushes third parties out. If intervention ends before institutions can deepen leader incentives for a unifying nationalism, violence will likely recur. We provide an “intervention diagnostic” that reflects these three dilemmas, which are a function of the type of intervention, local political development, and the identity of the intervener. In deciding whether to intervene, the limits of building self-enforcing peace should be weighed against the likelihood and costs of ongoing violence.

中文翻译:

止暴制平:民族战争后外强建国的困境

种族宗派战争后第三方能否建立国家?我们提供了一个积极的和平建设理论,强调任何外国干预固有的权衡取舍,即使干预资源充足且公平,也缩小了成功的条件。一个“宗派”困境出现了,因为和平必须依靠地方领导人,但通过民族教派冲突赢得声誉的领导人没有动力停止打民族牌,也不会提供公共产品。如果干预能够制止种族暴力并重建国家机构,就可以改变这些激励措施。但是,如果干预排挤地方领导人,限制国家合法性并限制国家建设的步伐,就会出现“体制”困境。窗口更长,随着人口从民族认同转向民族认同,外国主导的国家建设步伐放缓将因其自身的成功而结束,从而造成将第三方排除在外的“主权”困境。如果干预在机构能够加深领导者对统一民族主义的激励之前结束,暴力可能会再次发生。我们提供了反映这三个困境的“干预诊断”,它们是干预类型、当地政治发展和干预者身份的函数。在决定是否进行干预时,应权衡建立自我执行和平的限制与持续暴力的可能性和成本。如果干预在机构能够加深领导者对统一民族主义的激励之前结束,暴力可能会再次发生。我们提供了反映这三个困境的“干预诊断”,它们是干预类型、当地政治发展和干预者身份的函数。在决定是否进行干预时,应权衡建立自我执行和平的限制与持续暴力的可能性和成本。如果干预在机构能够加深领导者对统一民族主义的激励之前结束,暴力可能会再次发生。我们提供了反映这三个困境的“干预诊断”,它们是干预类型、当地政治发展和干预者身份的函数。在决定是否进行干预时,应权衡建立自我执行和平的限制与持续暴力的可能性和成本。
更新日期:2021-05-21
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