I present a model of repeated electoral competition between two parties. A part of the electorate votes retrospectively and considers the amount of rent-seeking by the incumbent party, while the prospective voters follow probabilistic party preferences when casting their votes. I show that it is possible to distinguish the effects of incumbency advantage and electoral punishment on the minimum level of rent-seeking consistent with equilibrium. As long as there is electoral punishment for excessive rent-seeking, a larger incumbency advantage increases accountability by decreasing the minimum amount of rent-seeking consistent with equilibrium. The reason for this is that the larger the incumbency advantage is, the more important the result of the next election for all future election outcomes is. Consequently, the incumbent party is willing to give up more rent-seeking opportunities to improve its electoral prospects. Increased accountability due to a larger share of retrospective voters hurts the political selection aspect of elections because it enables the incumbent party to win without the support of the majority of the prospective voters.

我提出了两党之间反复选举竞争的模型。部分选民进行回顾性投票，并考虑现任政党的寻租金额，而潜在选民在投票时遵循概率党的偏好。我表明，有可能区分在位优势和选举惩罚对与均衡相一致的最低寻租水平的影响。只要对过度寻租行为进行选举惩罚，更大的在职优势就会通过降低与均衡相一致的最小寻租数量来增加问责制。原因是，任职优势越大，对于所有将来的选举结果，下次选举的结果就越重要。最后，现任政党愿意放弃更多寻租机会，以改善其选举前景。由于回溯性选民的比例增加而导致的问责制增加，损害了选举的政治选择方面，因为它使现任政党在没有多数准选民支持的情况下获胜。