Abstract

We investigate how different motives shape the initial accounting for goodwill in a setting dominated by controlling owners, using data from 1112 acquisition analyses reported by Swedish listed acquiring firms. In contrast to prior studies, we find no evidence that earnings-based compensation affects the proportion of the purchased price accounted for as goodwill. Instead, we find that when a family-owned firm is the acquirer, a larger proportion of the purchase price is accounted for as goodwill than as specific assets and liabilities. These two findings indicate that controlling owners may curb managerial motives, while controlling family owners apply the discretion of IFRS 3 according to their motives. We also find in this setting that acquisition-related motives have a significant impact on the proportion of the purchased price accounted for as goodwill. Overall, our analyses indicate that the motives shaping goodwill accounting choices depend on the institutional setting.

摘要

我们使用来自瑞典上市收购公司报告的 1112 次收购分析的数据，研究了不同动机如何影响在控股股东占主导地位的环境中对商誉的初始会计处理。与之前的研究相比，我们发现没有证据表明基于收入的薪酬会影响作为商誉的购买价格的比例。相反，我们发现，当家族企业是收购方时，作为商誉的购买价格比作为特定资产和负债的比例更大。这两个发现表明，控股所有者可能会抑制管理动机，而控股家族所有者则根据其动机应用IFRS 3的自由裁量权。我们还发现，在这种情况下，与收购相关的动机对作为商誉的购买价格的比例有显着影响。总的来说，我们的分析表明，塑造商誉会计选择的动机取决于制度设置。