Purpose

This study aims to examine the significance of public/political corruption; trade tax revenue (import and export) on tax evasion in a group of 140 countries for the period 2008–2017. Sampled countries were subsequently grouped into four clusters for further testing. With the increase in globalization and technology, there is a potential of increased tax corruption on trade tariffs revenue activities.

Design/methodology/approach

The empirical testing was carried out using the technical and more advanced dynamic two-step system-generalized moment method. The econometrical method solves the problem of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity on cross-sectional data. This study used the data from World Bank, Transparency International, World Economic Forum and Kaufmann’s governance indicators.

Findings

There is statistical interaction between the corruption perception index (CPI) and international trade activities. Moreover, other results revealed that CPI and trade tax revenue activities are statistically insignificant to tax evasion in three groups; low corrupt countries, high corrupt and trade surplus countries although the coefficient signs remain consistent. This can be attributed by a low level of corruption in the low corrupt countries or concealment of corruption-related information in high corrupt countries and the low level of import evasion in trade surplus countries.

Originality/value

Based on the theory and results, public and political officials should promote good corporate governance by strictly monitoring trade revenue activities because parties involved can use technical criminality to conceal illegal behavior. Additionally, all jurisdictions should apply the economic theory of crime, especially in high political corrupt countries and perennial trade deficit countries because key macroeconomic tax revenue activities such as imports invite numerous forms of dishonesty.

中文翻译：

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逃税; 公共和政治腐败与国际贸易：全球视野

目的

本研究旨在检验公共/政治腐败的重要性；2008-2017 年期间 140 个国家的贸易税收（进出口）逃税。抽样国家随后被分为四个集群以进行进一步测试。随着全球化和技术的进步，贸易关税收入活动中的税收腐败有可能增加。

设计/方法/方法

使用技术和更先进的动态两步系统广义矩方法进行了经验测试。计量经济学方法解决了横截面数据的自相关和异方差问题。本研究使用了世界银行、透明国际、世界经济论坛和考夫曼治理指标的数据。

发现

腐败感知指数 (CPI) 与国际贸易活动之间存在统计交互作用。此外，其他结果显示，CPI 和贸易税收活动在三组中对逃税的统计不显着；低腐败国家、高腐败国家和贸易顺差国家，尽管系数符号保持一致。这可以归因于低腐败国家的低腐败水平或高腐败国家隐瞒腐败相关信息以及贸易顺差国家的进口逃税水平低。

原创性/价值

根据理论和结果，公共和政治官员应通过严格监控贸易收入活动来促进良好的公司治理，因为相关方可以利用技术犯罪来掩盖非法行为。此外，所有司法管辖区都应应用犯罪的经济理论，尤其是在政治腐败严重的国家和长期贸易逆差的国家，因为进口等关键宏观经济税收活动会引发多种形式的不诚实行为。