This study analyzes mergers and acquisitions (M&A) payment methods in large transactions of public U.S. acquirers between 2009 and 2016. While we find consistent with previous evidence that asymmetric information between acquirers and targets significantly influences the choice of M&A payment methods, we show that contrary to prevailing findings in the literature, acquirers cannot exploit their overvaluation through stock-financed M&A at targets’ disadvantage. In addition, when facing larger uncertainty in the counterparty’s valuation, a higher ratio of cash is applied in M&A payment. Our results document that both acquirers and targets are rational in choosing M&A payment methods.

本研究分析了 2009 年至 2016 年美国上市公司大宗交易中的并购（M&A）支付方式。虽然我们发现与先前的证据一致，即收购方和目标之间的信息不对称显着影响并购支付方式的选择，但我们发现相反与文献中的普遍发现相比，收购方不能在目标公司处于不利地位的情况下通过股票融资并购来利用其高估。此外，当交易对手估值存在较大不确定性时，并购支付中采用更高的现金比例。我们的结果表明，收购方和目标方在选择并购支付方式时都是理性的。