The chemical industry has an important role in our modern society. Due to the existence of hazardous materials and possible extreme producing conditions, chemical facilities are also considered dangerous. Research has pointed out that a successful attack on chemical plants may cause mass casualties, in the United States. Game theory has been employed to improve the protection of chemical plants, and current literature on chemical plant protection games assume a ‘rational’ attacker. The present paper studies a game-theoretic model, which is played by a rational defender and a ‘bounded rational’ attacker, for improving chemical plant protection. The attacker modeled in this paper is assumed to play higher payoff strategies with higher probabilities, which is innovative from the current chemical security literature. Attackers in the current chemical plant protection games would always play the strategy with the highest payoff (probability of 100%). Distribution-free uncertainties on attacker's parameters are also integrated into the model. An algorithm for solving the game presented in this paper is also proposed. A case study reveals that although a bounded rational attacker would reduce the defender's expected payoff, the defender's equilibrium strategy from the present model is robust to different attacker behaviors.

化学工业在现代社会中起着重要作用。由于存在危险材料和可能的极端生产条件，化学设施也被认为是危险的。研究指出，在美国，对化工厂的成功攻击可能会造成大规模人员伤亡。博弈论已被用来改善化工厂的保护，而目前有关化工厂保护博弈的文献都假定是“理性的”攻击者。本文研究了一种博弈论模型，该模型由理性防御者和“有界理性”攻击者玩耍，以改善化工厂的保护。假设本文中建模的攻击者以较高的概率发挥较高的收益策略，这是根据当前化学安全性文献进行创新的。当前化学工厂保护游戏中的攻击者将始终以最高的回报率（概率为100％）发挥战略作用。该模型还集成了攻击者参数的无分布不确定性。还提出了本文提出的一种求解游戏的算法。案例研究表明，尽管有限的理性攻击者会减少防御者的预期收益，但根据当前模型得出的防御者均衡策略对于不同的攻击者行为都是稳健的。