This paper builds on Kojima and Pathak (2009)'s result of vanishing manipulability in large stable mechanisms. We show that convergence toward truth-telling in stable mechanisms can be achieved much faster if colleges' preferences are independently drawn from an uniform distribution. Another novelty from our results is that they can be applied to competitive environments in which virtually all vacancies end up being filled. So this paper adds evidence to the fact that, though stable matching mechanisms are not entirely strategy-proof, in practice, when the number of participants in the market is sufficiently large, they can be treated as being effectively strategy-proof.

本文建立在 Kojima 和 Pathak (2009) 在大型稳定机制中的可操纵性消失的结果之上。我们表明，如果大学的偏好独立于均匀分布，则可以更快地在稳定机制中实现向说真话的收敛。我们结果的另一个新颖之处在于，它们可以应用于几乎所有职位空缺最终都被填补的竞争环境。因此，本文补充了一个事实，即虽然稳定的匹配机制并不完全是策略证明，但在实践中，当市场参与者的数量足够大时，它们可以被视为有效的策略证明。