We study a model of Bayesian persuasion between a designer and a receiver with one substantial deviation from the standard setup—the designer offers once and for all a single statistical experiment from which the receiver can acquire costly i.i.d. signals over time. Taking a 2-state-2-action environment and employing a tractable continuous-time framework, we fully characterize the optimal persuasion policy. When the receiver features high skepticism, the optimal policy is to immediately reveal the truth, which is true for a large set of primitives. We construct the designer’s maximum payoff and find a discontinuous drop in it as compared with the standard model. Unlike in many standard persuasion models, the designer is not able to appropriate all the rents of information disclosure while the receiver often achieves the highest possible benefit from being able to repeatedly sample from the strategically offered information structure.

我们研究了设计者和接收器之间的贝叶斯说服模型，与标准设置有很大的偏差——设计者一劳永逸地提供了一个单一的统计实验，接收器可以随着时间的推移获取昂贵的 iid 信号。采用 2-state-2-action 环境并采用易于处理的连续时间框架，我们充分表征了最佳说服策略。当接收者表现出高度怀疑时，最佳策略是立即揭示真相，这对于大量原语是正确的。我们构建了设计师的最大收益，并发现与标准模型相比，它出现了不连续的下降。与许多标准的说服模型不同，