I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck, an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency.

中文翻译：

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幸运的无知、模态和缺乏知识

我反对无知的标准观点，根据该观点，无知被定义为等同于缺乏知识，环境认知运气的情况虽然导致缺乏知识，但不一定意味着无知。为了支持我的论点，我认为在环境运气的情况下，代理人通过成功地行使她的认知能动性而保留了我所谓的对相关事实的认知访问，并且与标准观点的预测相反，无知和非无知是在知识是的意义上不是模态的。在对反对意见作出回应后，我总结了以认知通达和认知能动性概念为中心的对无知的另一种描述。