There is almost no theoretical discussion of non-human animal well-being in the philosophical literature on well-being. To begin to rectify this, I develop a desire satisfaction theory of well-being for animals. I contrast this theory with my desire theory of well-being for humans, according to which a human benefits from satisfying desires for which she can offer reasons. I consider objections. The most important are (1) Eden Lin's claim that the correct theory of well-being cannot vary across different welfare subjects and (2) his objection against theories of human well-being that require exercising a sophisticated capacity such as reason giving.

中文翻译：

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人类和动物福祉

在关于幸福的哲学文献中几乎没有关于非人类动物幸福的理论讨论。为了开始纠正这一点，我开发了一种动物幸福的欲望满足理论。我将这个理论与我的人类幸福的欲望理论进行了对比，根据该理论，人类从满足欲望中受益，她可以为之提供理由。我考虑反对意见。最重要的是（1）Eden Lin 的主张，即正确的幸福理论不会因不同的福利主体而异；（2）他反对需要运用复杂能力（例如给出理由）的人类幸福理论。