This article discusses Hans Jonas’ argument for teleology in living organisms, in light of recently raised concerns over enactivism’s “Jonasian turn.” Drawing on textual resources rarely discussed in contemporary enactivist literature on Jonas’ philosophy, we reconstruct five core ideas of his thinking: 1) That natural science’s rejection of teleology is methodological rather than ontological, and thus not a proof of its non-existence; 2) that denial of the reality of teleology amounts to a performative self-contradiction; 3) that the fact of evolution makes it implausible that only humans actualize purpose; 4) that the concept of metabolism delimits and gestures towards beings performing purposive activity; and 5) that concrete encounters with living organisms are indispensable for the judgment that they are purposive. Lastly, we draw attention to how Jonas’ understanding of teleology and inwardness in nonhuman life in terms of degrees of identity with human life poses a problem for his view. In this way, we hope to clarify what Jonas, as an important source of inspiration for the enactivist project, is proposing.

鉴于最近有人对环保主义的“乔纳斯式转向”提出了担忧，本文讨论了汉斯·乔纳斯（Hans Jonas）关于活体目的论的论点。我们利用乔纳斯哲学在当代复兴主义者文学中很少讨论的文本资源，重构了他思想的五个核心思想：1）自然科学拒绝目的论是方法论的，而不是本体论的，因此不能证明其不存在；2）否认目的论的真实性等于行为上的自相矛盾；3）进化的事实使仅人类实现目标变得难以置信；4）新陈代谢的概念划定了人们对他们进行目的性活动的姿态；5）与生物体的具体接触对于判断它们是有目的性是必不可少的。最后，我们提请注意乔纳斯对非人类生活的目的论和内在性与人类生活的认同程度的理解如何给他的观点带来了问题。通过这种方式，我们希望澄清乔纳斯（Jonas）作为激进主义者计划的重要灵感来源提出的建议。