This paper reports preliminary evidence from a pilot study (n=91, with 455 decisions) on issues of decision time and race in distributive fairness decisions in South Africa. We conduct a dictator game to gather data on transfer amounts and time taken for decisions, where dictators are paired with a series of partners with whom they either share or do not share race. Our results are not in line with the empirical evidence that suggests that impulsive decisions are fair: transfers in our sample increase with decision time, with fairer decisions taking longer than selfish decisions. We note significantly higher transfers to black receivers from black decision-makers. White dictators give more to white receivers in very short ($<$15 second) decisions, but when they take more time to decide, more is given to black versus white receivers. This race-based discrimination in transfers appears to be primarily motivated by inequality aversion: black receivers are (correctly) assumed to have lower income than their white peers. Although our sample is small, the evidence of willingness to reduce perceived race-based inequality has encouraging implications for redistributive policies in the country, and therefore warrants further investigation.

本文报告了一项关于南非分配公平决策中决策时间和竞争问题的初步研究（n = 91，有455个决策）的初步证据。我们进行独裁者游戏，收集有关转移金额和决策所需时间的数据，其中独裁者与一系列他们共享或不共享种族的伙伴配对。我们的结果与表明冲动决策是公平的经验证据不一致：我们的样本转移随着决策时间而增加，更公平的决策比自私的决策需要更长的时间。我们注意到黑人决策者向黑人接受者的转移明显增加。白色独裁者在很短的时间内就给白色接收者更多的收益（$<$15秒）的决定，但是当他们花费更多的时间来决定时，黑色接收器和白色接收器的分配更多。这种基于种族的转移支付歧视主要是由于不平等的厌恶所致：（正确地）假定黑人收入者的收入低于白人收入者。尽管我们的样本量很小，但愿意减少人们认为的基于种族的不平等现象的证据对该国的再分配政策产生了令人鼓舞的影响，因此值得进一步调查。