The incentive and supervision design of cooperation between banks and B2B platforms was studied under the electronic warehouse receipt pledge financing model. Under the assumptions of B2B platform risk, neutrality, and risk aversion, a principal-agent model for cooperation was established between banks and B2B platforms. Its purpose was to expand and compare the models by adding supervision variables. It also helps to analyze the effects of risk aversion coefficients on effort level, fixed payment, incentive coefficients, and the impact of bank income. This paper has analyzed the banking system’s incentives and supervision mechanisms by performing numerical analysis on big data. We have used MATLAB for numerical analysis. The results show that banks’ expected benefits when cooperating with risk-neutral B2B platforms are always greater than the expected benefits obtained when cooperating with risk-averse B2B platforms. But when banks act, the increase in profits exceeds the cost of regulatory measures. Besides, when the bank takes supervisory measures, the profit will be greater than the profit without supervisory measures. Hence, the B2B platform’s ability to recover losses is positively correlated with the bank’s expected utility. The cost coefficient of the B2B platform is negatively correlated with the bank’s expected utility. The risk aversion degree does not affect the optimal effort level of the B2B platform, but it affects the optimal fixed payment and the optimal incentive coefficient.

中文翻译：

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大数据在线供应链金融中第三方B2B平台上银行的激励与监督机制

在电子仓库凭单质押融资模式下，研究了银行与B2B平台合作的激励与监管设计。在B2B平台风险，中立性和风险规避的假设下，建立了银行与B2B平台之间合作的委托-代理模型。其目的是通过添加监管变量来扩展和比较模型。它还有助于分析风险规避系数对工作量，固定付款，激励系数以及银行收入的影响。本文通过对大数据进行数值分析，分析了银行体系的激励机制和监管机制。我们已经使用MATLAB进行了数值分析。结果表明，与风险中立的B2B平台合作时，银行的预期收益始终大于与规避风险的B2B平台合作时获得的预期收益。但是，当银行采取行动时，利润的增长超过了监管措施的成本。此外，当银行采取监管措施时，其利润将大于无监管措施时的利润。因此，B2B平台弥补损失的能力与银行的预期效用正相关。B2B平台的成本系数与银行的预期效用负相关。风险规避度不会影响B2B平台的最佳工作量，但会影响最佳固定支付和最佳激励系数。但是，当银行采取行动时，利润的增长超过了监管措施的成本。此外，当银行采取监管措施时，其利润将大于无监管措施时的利润。因此，B2B平台弥补损失的能力与银行的预期效用正相关。B2B平台的成本系数与银行的预期效用负相关。风险规避度不会影响B2B平台的最佳工作量，但会影响最佳固定支付和最佳激励系数。但是，当银行采取行动时，利润的增长超过了监管措施的成本。此外，当银行采取监管措施时，其利润将大于无监管措施时的利润。因此，B2B平台弥补损失的能力与银行的预期效用正相关。B2B平台的成本系数与银行的预期效用负相关。风险规避度不会影响B2B平台的最佳工作量，但会影响最佳固定支付和最佳激励系数。B2B平台弥补损失的能力与银行的预期效用正相关。B2B平台的成本系数与银行的预期效用负相关。风险规避度不会影响B2B平台的最佳工作量，但会影响最佳固定支付和最佳激励系数。B2B平台弥补损失的能力与银行的预期效用正相关。B2B平台的成本系数与银行的预期效用负相关。风险规避度不会影响B2B平台的最佳工作量，但会影响最佳固定支付和最佳激励系数。