This study examines the value relevance of bank cash holdings information and the moderating effect of board outside multiple directorships on such relevance. Our sample is based on a dual-banking system (i.e., conventional and Islamic banks) which represents 70 listed banks for the period from 2010 to 2018. On average, our analysis indicates that investors negatively value banks’ holdings of large free cash flow. However, having busy board outside members, who are able to monitor that free cash reserves more effectively, tends to enhance the public confidence and in turn, cancel out the negative value relevance of cash holding information. Moreover, the predicted reputational benefits of appointing busy directors are not prevalent in the context of Islamic banking, which requires stricter monitoring by boards due to the complex business model adopted, distinctive systems of governance, and higher agency conflicts when compared to conventional banking.

本研究考察了银行现金持有信息的价值相关性以及董事会在多个董事之外对此类相关性的调节作用。我们的样本基于代表 2010 年至 2018 年期间 70 家上市银行的双银行体系（即传统银行和伊斯兰银行）。平均而言，我们的分析表明，投资者对银行持有的大量自由现金流持负面评价。然而，拥有忙碌的董事会外部成员，他们能够更有效地监控自由现金储备，往往会增强公众信心，从而抵消现金持有信息的负价值相关性。此外，在伊斯兰银行业的背景下，任命忙碌的董事的预期声誉收益并不普遍，