In an Isis 2008 review of research in History and Philosophy of Science (HPS), Galison opened discussion on ten on-going HPS problems. It is however unclear to what extent these problems, and constraints on their solutions, are of HPS’s own making. Recent research provides a basic resolution of these issues. In a recent paper Hooker (Perspect Sci 26(2): 266–291, 2018b) proposed that the discipline(s) of HPS should themselves also be understood to employ paradigms in HPS to understand science, analogously to those employed in science to understand scientific domains. The paper argued for recognising at least two paradigms, one based on logic, and analytic forms more generally, the other based on deliberative judgement making. The present paper aims to use paradigmatic responses to Galison’s problems to explore the differing natures, merits and limitations of these two paradigms. This exploration also reveals the basic inadequacy of the analytic paradigm to illuminate the conduct of science, thereby permitting many of his problems to be dissolved rather than solved.

在伊希斯2008年，加里森（Galison）对《历史与科学哲学（HPS）》的研究进行了回顾，就10个持续存在的HPS问题展开了讨论。但是，目前尚不清楚这些问题及其解决方案的限制在多大程度上由HPS自行制造。最近的研究提供了这些问题的基本解决方案。Hooker在最近的一篇论文中（Perspect Sci 26（2）：266-291，2018b）提出，也应该将HPS学科本身理解为在HPS中采用范式来理解科学，类似于在科学中采用的范式来理解科学。科学领域。该论文主张识别至少两种范式，一种范式是基于逻辑和更广泛的分析形式，另一种范式是基于审慎判断的。本文旨在利用对加里森问题的范式反应来探索不同的性质，这两种范式的优缺点。这项探索还揭示了分析范式在阐明科学行为方面的基本不足，从而使他的许多问题得以解决而不是得以解决。