Methodological individualists often claim that any social phenomenon can ultimately be explained in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Any Nagelian version of methodological individualism requires that there be bridge laws that translate social statements into individualistic ones. We show that Nagelian individualism can be put to logical scrutiny by making the relevant social and individualistic languages fully explicit and mathematically precise. In particular, we prove that the social statement that a group of (at least two) agents performs a deontically admissible group action cannot be expressed in a well-established deontic logic of agency that models every combination of actions, omissions, abilities, and obligations of finitely many individual agents.

方法论上的个人主义者经常声称，任何社会现象都可以最终根据个人的行为和互动来解释。任何方法主义个人主义的纳粹主义版本都要求有将社会陈述转化为个人主义陈述的桥梁法则。我们表明，可以通过使相关的社会和个人主义语言完全明确且在数学上精确来对纳格里亚人的个人主义进行逻辑审查。尤其是，我们证明，由（至少两个）代理组成的团体执行不可否认的集体行动的社会陈述不能以建立完善的代理逻辑来表达，该逻辑对行为，疏忽，能力和义务的每种组合进行建模数量有限的个体代理。