Parliamentary intention is a central aspect of statutory interpretation despite the many questions that exist concerning its normative role and desirability. In Lacey v. Attorney-General (Qld) and Zheng v. Cai, the High Court of Australia sought to diminish the role of objective parliamentary intention in statutory interpretation by alluding to a need for interpretive principles to be based on an understanding of the broader constitutional framework. This article argues that parliamentary intention has an important role to play within the modern statutory interpretation approach as adopted in Australia. Particularly, it is argued that an over-reliance upon statutory interpretation presumptions as a proxy for interpreting the legal meaning of statutes as opposed to an inquiry to discern parliamentary intention as informed by text, context, and purpose, leads to questionable interpretive results. Parliamentary intention is also consistent with the broader constitutional constraints as alluded by the High Court with respect to constitutional values such as the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branch, and statutes being a product of an exercise of legislative power by democratically elected members of Parliament.

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议会意图：解读其在澳大利亚宪法背景下的法定解释中的作用

尽管存在许多关于其规范作用和可取性的问题，但议会意图是法定解释的核心方面。在 Lacey v. Attorney-General (Qld) 和 Zheng v. Cai 案中，澳大利亚高等法院试图削弱客观议会意图在法规解释中的作用，暗示解释性原则需要建立在对更广泛的理解的基础上宪法框架。本文认为，在澳大利亚采用的现代法定解释方法中，议会意图具有重要作用。特别是，有人认为，过度依赖法律解释推定作为解释法规法律含义的代理，而不是根据文本、上下文、和目的，导致有问题的解释结果。议会的意图也符合高等法院就宪法价值所暗示的更广泛的宪法约束，例如司法和立法部门之间的权力分立，以及法规是民主选举产生的成员行使立法权的产物。议会。