This paper explores a model in which the agent's effort affects (solely) the precision (variance) of a performance measure (signal) of the outcome. Both the principal and the agent are risk averse. The contract the principal offers is composed of a fixed payment plus variable compensation, depending on the outcome and based on a (linear) risk-sharing rule between the principal and the agent. Moral hazard alone leads to an upward distortion (above the first-best) of the risk-sharing rule. This serves to induce more effort to increase information precision. Adverse selection alone introduces two new features. First, to reduce informational rents, the risk-sharing rule is distorted downward below the first-best. Second, to induce truthful information revelation, the risk-sharing rule becomes increasing with the expected outcome—the agent's private information. When moral hazard and adverse selection are considered together, and there is enough uncertainty related to adverse selection, the risk-sharing rule is above the first-best for more efficient types, but below the first-best for less efficient types. Further, the precision of the signal increases with the expected outcome.

中文翻译：

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关于信息的准确性

本文探讨了一个模型，其中代理的努力（仅）影响结果的性能度量（信号）的精度（方差）。委托人和代理人都是风险厌恶者。委托人提供的合同由固定付款加上可变补偿组成，具体取决于结果并基于委托人与代理人之间的（线性）风险分担规则。仅道德风险就会导致风险分担规则向上扭曲（高于最佳）。这有助于引起更多努力以提高信息精度。仅逆向选择就引入了两个新特征。首先，为了减少信息租金，风险分担规则被向下扭曲到第一最佳以下。其次，为了诱导真实的信息披露，风险分担规则随着预期结果——代理人——而增加 s 私人信息。当道德风险和逆向选择一起考虑，并且逆向选择有足够的不确定性时，风险分担规则对于效率较高的类型高于第一最佳，但对于效率较低的类型低于第一最佳。此外，信号的精度随着预期结果的增加而增加。