Some authors have recently suggested that it is time to consider rights for robots. These suggestions are based on the claim that the question of robot rights should not depend on a standard set of conditions for ‘moral status’; but instead, the question is to be framed in a new way, by rejecting the is/ought distinction, making a relational turn, or assuming a methodological behaviourism. We try to clarify these suggestions and to show their highly problematic consequences. While we find the suggestions ultimately unmotivated, the discussion shows that our epistemic condition with respect to the moral status of others does raise problems, and that the human tendency to empathise with things that do not have moral status should be taken seriously—we suggest that it produces a “derived moral status”. Finally, it turns out that there is typically no individual in real AI that could even be said to be the bearer of moral status. Overall, there is no reason to think that robot rights are an issue now.

一些作者最近建议，是时候考虑机器人的权利了。这些建议是基于这样的主张，即机器人权利问题不应取决于“道德状态”的标准条件。但是相反，该问题应该以一种新的方式来界定，即拒绝存在/应该的区别，进行关系转向或采取方法上的行为主义。我们试图澄清这些建议并显示其严重问题的后果。尽管我们发现这些建议最终没有动机，但讨论表明，我们在与他人的道德状况有关的认知条件上确实引起了问题，应该认真对待人类倾向于不道德的事物的倾向。我们建议它产生了“派生的道德地位”。最后，事实证明，在真正的AI中通常没有一个人甚至可以说是道德地位的承担者。总体而言，没有理由认为机器人权利现在是一个问题。