Humanoid robots used for sexual purposes (sexbots) are beginning to look increasingly lifelike. It is possible for a user to have a bespoke sexbot created which matches their exact requirements in skin pigmentation, hair and eye colour, body shape, and genital design. This means that it is possible—and increasingly easy—for a sexbot to be created which bears a very high degree of resemblance to a particular person. There is a small but steadily increasing literature exploring some of the ethical issues surrounding sexbots, however sexbots made to look like particular people is something which, as yet, has not been philosophically addressed in the literature. In this essay I argue that creating a lifelike sexbot to represent and resemble someone is an act of sexual objectification which morally requires consent, and that doing so without the person’s consent is intrinsically wrong. I consider two sexbot creators: Roy and Fred. Roy creates a sexbot of Katie with her consent, and Fred creates a sexbot of Jane without her consent. I draw on the work of Alan Goldman, Rae Langton, and Martha Nussbaum in particular to demonstrate that creating a sexbot of a particular person requires consent if it is to be intrinsically permissible.

用于性目的的人形机器人（性机器人）开始变得越来越逼真。用户可以创建一个定制的sexbot，该机器人满足他们在皮肤色素沉着，头发和眼睛的颜色，身体形状和生殖器设计方面的确切要求。这意味着有可能并且越来越容易地创建一个与特定人非常相似的性机器人。有少量但稳步增长的文献探讨与性机器人有关的一些伦理问题，然而，使性机器人看起来像特定的人的事情至今尚未在哲学上得到哲学上的解决。在本文中，我认为创建一个栩栩如生的性爱机器人来代表并模仿某人是性客体化行为，在道德上需要征得同意，而且，未经当事人同意，这样做本质上是错误的。我考虑了两个性爱机器人的创造者：罗伊（Roy）和弗雷德（Fred）。罗伊（Roy）在同意的情况下创建了凯蒂（Katie）的性爱机器人，弗雷德（Fred）在未经她的同意下创建了简（Jane）的色情机器人。我特别借鉴了艾伦·戈德曼（Alan Goldman），雷·兰顿（Rae Langton）和玛莎·努斯鲍姆（Martha Nussbaum）的作品，以证明创建一个特定性别的性爱机器人必须得到同意才能真正获得许可。