Prior studies find that delayed earnings announcements tend to communicate unfavorable news, and investors react negatively when firms delay earnings announcements. However, these findings do not explain why investors discount delayed earnings, even after controlling for the earnings news, and why firms sometimes announce good news late. Motivated by theory from Trueman (1990) that attempts to explain these phenomena, we examine whether announcement delays indicate earnings management. We predict and find that good news firms with higher discretionary accruals are more likely to announce earnings late. Consistent with post fiscal year-end activities driving announcement delays, we fail to find a relation between measures of real earnings management and late announcements. Using a last-chance earnings management measure based on tax expense manipulation, we also predict and find strong evidence that good news firms engaging in last-chance earnings management are more likely to delay earnings announcements. Consistent with Trueman's (1990) theory that earnings management explains why investors discount delayed earnings announcements, we find that, on average, earnings announcement returns are 1.4% lower for late announcers relying on last-chance earnings management to report good news. Overall, our findings suggest that announcement delays provide information about not only the sign of the earnings news but also the potential for earnings management.

中文翻译：

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为什么公司会延迟发布好消息：收益管理和财务报告的及时性*

先前的研究发现，延迟的收益公告往往会传达不利的消息，当公司延迟收益公告时，投资者会做出负面反应。然而，这些发现并不能解释为什么即使在控制了盈利新闻之后，投资者也会对延迟的盈利进行折扣，以及为什么公司有时会延迟发布好消息。受 Trueman (1990) 试图解释这些现象的理论的启发，我们检验了公告延迟是否表明盈余管理。我们预测并发现，具有较高可自由支配应计费用的好消息公司更有可能延迟公布收益。与导致公告延迟的财政年度结束后活动一致，我们未能发现实际盈余管理措施与延迟公告之间的关系。使用基于税收费用操纵的最后机会盈余管理措施，我们还预测并发现强有力的证据表明，从事最后机会盈余管理的好消息公司更有可能延迟盈利公告。与 Trueman (1990) 的理论一致，即盈余管理解释了为什么投资者对延迟的盈余公告进行折扣，我们发现，对于依靠最后机会盈余管理来报告好消息的迟到的公告者来说，平均而言，盈余公告的回报率要低 1.4%。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，公告延迟不仅提供了有关盈余新闻迹象的信息，而且还提供了盈余管理潜力的信息。与 Trueman (1990) 的理论一致，即盈余管理解释了为什么投资者对延迟的盈余公告进行折扣，我们发现，对于依靠最后机会盈余管理来报告好消息的迟到的公告者来说，平均而言，盈余公告的回报率要低 1.4%。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，公告延迟不仅提供了有关盈余新闻迹象的信息，而且还提供了盈余管理潜力的信息。与 Trueman (1990) 的理论一致，即盈余管理解释了为什么投资者对延迟的盈余公告进行折扣，我们发现，对于依靠最后机会盈余管理来报告好消息的迟到的公告者来说，平均而言，盈余公告的回报率要低 1.4%。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，公告延迟不仅提供了有关盈余新闻迹象的信息，而且还提供了盈余管理潜力的信息。