当前位置: X-MOL 学术Ratio Juris › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
European Values in the Charter of Fundamental Rights: An Introduction
Ratio Juris Pub Date : 2021-05-16 , DOI: 10.1111/raju.12308
Alessandra Facchi 1 , Nicola Riva 1
Affiliation  

The adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, first proclaimed at the Nice European Council of December 2000, marked a qualitative change in the nature of an organization that had previously been described—and is still being described by many of its critics—as mainly interested in promoting economic cooperation and development. Since then, the European Union has been able to refer to the Charter as its “positive moral code,” a source of normative commitments that was given binding legal force with the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 (entered into force in 2009).

According to its drafters, the Charter was aimed at reaffirming a catalogue of fundamental rights that were considered to be already part of European Union law. The preamble of the Charter explicitly mentions as its reference sources the constitutional traditions and the international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Social Charters adopted by the European Union and the Council of Europe, and the case‐law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights.

The Charter is more than a mere “summary” of what had already been achieved by the European Union and its Member States in the field of fundamental rights. Among the innovative features of the Charter is the fact that it organizes fundamental rights around six key concepts—dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice—that can be understood as the values providing a foundation for fundamental rights and that those rights articulate.11 For an analysis of the Charter’s normative content in light of the decisions of the European courts with a focus on the ideas of dignity, freedoms, equality, and solidarity, see A. Facchi, P. Parolari, and N. Riva, Values in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal‐Philosophical Analysis with a Focus on Migrants’ Rights (Turin: Giappichelli, 2019). The book is open access and can be downloaded from the NoVaMigra project website at https://novamigra.eu/index.php?c=50_publications or from the publisher’s website at https://www.giappichelli.it/values‐in‐the‐eu‐charter‐of‐fundamental‐rights‐22575.

The European research project NoVaMigra: Norms and Values in the European Migration and Refugee Crisis, funded by the European Commission under the Horizon 2020 program,22 The NoVaMigra project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 770330. includes among its tasks a reconstruction of the normative commitments of the European Union in light of the Charter, that is, of the set of values, principles, and rights that should guide public and private institutions in designing and implementing their migration and refugee policies. In the frame of this research project, we asked six scholars to sketch their conception of one of the Charter’s values—dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizenship, and justice—and to articulate their perspective on how that value should be better understood and developed in the context of the European project.

From different scholarly perspectives and approaches, the six resulting papers—here published in the order of the Charter’s titles—offer interesting insights into the Charter’s core values and provide conceptual tools and arguments that can contribute to an understanding of its normative potential.33 First drafts of these papers were presented and discussed at the NoVaMigra international conference European Values in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, held in Milan on September 9 and 10, 2019.

For the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, dignity is “a fundamental right in itself” and “constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights.”44 “Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights,” prepared by the Praesidium of the Convention that drafted the Charter. OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, pp. 17–35, available at https://eur‐lex.europa.eu/legal‐content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32007X1214%2801%29. Observing that the Charter doesn’t say anything about the human dignity of migrants, Richard Brownsword shifts the focus to state responsibility and outlines three tiers of that responsibility. On the basis of these tiers it can be assessed what is cosmopolitan, non‐negotiable, and what is local, left to competing interests in the communities, and it can be determined when and how states should engage with the human dignity of migrants.

In the Charter, freedom is understood as something which needs to, and must, be created: a political goal to be reached through the guarantee of fundamental rights. Catherine Audard points out the inconsistencies between the principles enshrined in the Charter and the reality of present policies. By criticizing what she calls the “commodification” of freedoms and the utilitarian conception of persons at its basis, she seizes on a Kantian anthropology and argues for the need to connect freedom with agency, not simply with mere choices or possibilities.

Title III of the Charter refers to different concepts of equality: formal equality (Art. 20), procedural equality in the form of nondiscrimination (Arts. 21and 22), and substantive equality in the form of equality of opportunity (Arts. 23 and 26). Investigating the relationship between these different concepts, Gianfrancesco Zanetti claims that equality should be understood as a complex and plural notion and defends the merits of a bottom‐up approach to it, that, understanding equality as always situated, proceeds from a consideration of existing inequalities and of the struggles to overcome it.

Philippe Van Parijs distinguishes three different senses of solidarity that can apply to the European Union: solidarity as (factual) interdependence, solidarity as a set of obligations between Member States, and solidarity as a set of obligations between European citizens. According to his analysis, normative solidarity consists in a sort of counterfactual reciprocity, different from both the kind of reciprocity that underlies insurance and from charity. Van Parijs considers what is needed to reinforce European solidarity and suggests that we should try to go beyond solidarity and move towards realizing social justice in the European Union.

Central to the project of the European Union is the aim of overcoming the tension identified by Hannah Arendt between national citizenship and human rights protection by developing a new model of federal or even cosmopolitan citizenship, both denationalized and based on human rights protection. Justine Lacroix critically reflects on recent developments in some East European countries, where the rule of law is undergoing a process of progressive dismantlement, and on the condition of asylum seekers in the European Union after the 2015 crisis, raising some doubts about the actual commitment of the European Union to realize that ideal.

For Gianluigi Palombella, access to justice has a prominent role in the European Union’s complex and “multilevel” order, especially when it comes to reaffirming its unitary structure. He focuses on the contours and contents of the right of access to justice, on its dynamic and pluralistic nature, and on its autonomy vis à vis substantive rights or public interest directives. Finally, he stresses its dual character as a fundamental right and as a foundation for legality, that is, a requirement of the ideal of the rule of law.

European values and the need to reaffirm these values as distinctive to a European cultural tradition are often invoked to support restrictive migration and refugee policies, but the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union seems to point in a different direction. The values it includes, and the way they are articulated, provide a framework for imagining a more inclusive Europe, where fundamental rights could also serve as a guarantee for a peaceful cohabitation of differences. It is to the articulation of such an ideal that the papers that follow contribute.



中文翻译:

基本权利宪章中的欧洲价值观:简介

2000年12月在尼斯欧洲理事会上首次宣布通过的《欧洲联盟基本权利宪章》,标志着该组织性质的质变,此前已作过描述-许多批评家仍在描述中-主要兴趣在于促进经济合作与发展。从那时起,欧洲联盟便能够将《宪章》称为其“积极的道德守则”,这是规范承诺的来源,并根据2007年的《里斯本条约》(于2009年生效)赋予了具有约束力的法律效力。

据其起草者称,《宪章》旨在重申一系列基本权利,这些基本权利已被视为欧洲联盟法律的一部分。《宪章》的序言明确提到作为会员国共同的宪法传统和国际义务,《欧洲保护人权和基本自由公约》,欧洲联盟和欧洲理事会通过的《欧洲社会宪章》作为参考。欧洲以及欧洲联盟法院和欧洲人权法院的判例法。

《宪章》不仅仅是欧洲联盟及其成员国在基本权利领域已经取得的成就的“摘要”。《宪章》的创新特征之一是,它围绕六个关键概念(尊严,自由,平等,团结,公民权利和正义)组织了基本权利,这可以理解为为基本权利奠定基础的价值观,并且阐明这些权利。11要根据欧洲法院的裁决对《宪章》的规范性内容进行分析,并着重于尊严,自由,平等和团结的思想,请参阅A. Facchi,P.Parolari和N.Riva,《价值观》。 《欧盟基本权利宪章:以移民权利为重点的法律哲学分析》(都灵:Giappichelli,2019年)。这本书是开放获取的,可以从NoVaMigra项目网站https://novamigra.eu/index.php?c=50_publications或从出版商网站https://www.giappichelli.it/values-in-下载。欧盟基本权利书第22575条。

欧洲研究项目NoVaMigra:欧洲移民和难民危机中的规范和价值,由欧洲委员会根据“地平线2020”计划资助22 NoVaMigra项目已从欧洲联盟的Horizo​​n 2020研究与创新计划中获得了资助,资助号为770330。在其任务中包括根据《宪章》重建欧洲联盟的规范承诺,即应指导公共和私营机构设计和实施其移民和难民政策的一系列价值观,原则和权利。在此研究项目的框架中,我们请六位学者勾勒出他们对《宪章》价值观之一的尊严,自由,平等,团结,公民权和正义的构想,并阐明他们对如何更好地理解和理解该价值观的观点。在欧洲项目的背景下开发。

从不同的学术角度和方法上,本文所产生的六篇论文(按《宪章》标题的顺序出版)对《宪章》的核心价值提供了有趣的见解,并提供了有助于理解其规范潜力的概念性工具和论点。33这些论文的初稿在2019年9月9日至10日在米兰举行的NoVaMigra国际会议《基本价值观宪章中的欧洲价值观》国际会议上进行了介绍和讨论。

对于《欧洲基本权利宪章》,尊严本身就是“一项基本权利”,“构成了基本权利的真正基础。” 44由起草《宪章》的公约院编写的“与《基本权利宪章》有关的解释”。OJ C 303,2007年12月14日,第17-35页,网址为https://eur‐lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32007X1214%2801%29。理查德·布朗索恩德(Richard Brownsword)注意到《宪章》并未说明移民的人格尊严,因此将重点转移到国家责任上,并概述了该责任的三个层次。在这些等级的基础上,可以评估哪些是国际性的,不可商量的,什么是地方性的,留给社区中相互竞争的利益,并且可以确定国家何时以及如何与移民的人类尊严进行交往。

在《宪章》中,自由被理解为必须并且必须被创造的东西:通过保障基本权利来实现的政治目标。凯瑟琳·奥达德(Catherine Audard)指出了《宪章》所载原则与现行政策之间的矛盾。通过批评她所谓的自由“商品化”和以功利主义为基础的人,她抓住了康德人类学,并主张有必要将自由与代理联系起来,而不仅仅是将选择或可能性联系起来。

《宪章》第三章提到了不同的平等概念:形式平等(第20条),形式上的非歧视性程序平等(第21和22条)以及机会均等形式的实质平等(第23和26条) )。Gianfrancesco Zanetti研究了这些不同概念之间的关系后,声称平等应被理解为复杂和多元的概念,并捍卫自下而上的方法的优点,即,一如既往地理解平等,源于对现有不平等的考虑。以及克服它的斗争。

菲利普·范·帕里斯(Philippe Van Parijs)区分了可适用于欧盟的三种不同的团结感:团结是(事实上的)相互依存;团结是成员国之间的一系列义务;团结是欧洲公民之间的一组义务。根据他的分析,规范上的团结在于一种反事实互惠,既不同于作为保险基础的互惠互惠,也不同于慈善。范·帕里斯(Van Parijs)考虑了加强欧洲团结的需要,并建议我们应努力超越团结,朝着实现欧盟的社会正义迈进。

欧洲联盟项目的中心目的是通过开发一种新的联邦制甚至大都会公民身份的模型来克服汉娜·阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)所确定的国家公民身份与人权保护之间的紧张关系,这种新模型既可以取消国籍,也可以基于人权保护。贾斯汀·拉克鲁瓦(Justine Lacroix)批判性地回顾了一些法治正在逐步解体的东欧国家的最新事态发展,以及在2015年危机后欧盟寻求庇护者的状况,这使人们对联合国的实际承诺产生了一些怀疑。欧盟实现这一理想。

对于詹卢吉·帕隆贝拉(Gianluigi Palombella)而言,诉诸司法在欧洲联盟复杂和“多层次”的秩序中发挥着重要作用,尤其是在重申其单一结构方面。他着重于诉诸司法权的轮廓和内容,其动态和多元化的性质以及相对于实体权利或公共利益指令的自主权。最后,他强调其双重性是一项基本权利和合法性的基础,即对法治理想的要求。

欧洲价值观和重申这些价值观是欧洲文化传统所特有的需求,常常被用来支持限制性移民和难民政策,但是《欧盟基本权利宪章》似乎指向了不同的方向。它所包含的价值及其表达方式,为构想一个更具包容性的欧洲提供了框架,在欧洲,基本权利也可以作为和平共处差异的保证。紧随其后的论文正是对这种理想的表达。

更新日期:2021-05-17
down
wechat
bug