Governance regimes that assign exclusive access to support collective action are increasingly promoted to manage common-pool resources under the premise that they foster environmental stewardship. However, experimental evidence linked to existing policies that support this premise is lacking. Overlapping access policies in small-scale fisheries provide a unique opportunity to test the effects of access regimes on users’ stewardship behaviors. We performed a lab-in-the-field experiment to assess how fishers’ previous experience with access regimes relates to compliance and peer enforcement (n = 120). Fishers’ compliance and peer-enforcement decisions were compared in a common-pool-resource game. Treatments differed in framing to represent exclusive access and pseudo-open access regimes, both of which fishers face in real life. To contrast behavior in the game with real-life observations, we compared fishers’ associations that have shown relatively high and low management performance under exclusive access policies. Compliance and peer enforcement were higher under the exclusive access treatment than under the pseudo-open access treatment only for fishers’ associations with high management performance in real life. Behaviors in the game reflected differences between associations in real life. Our results support previous research on ocean governance by experimentally assessing the role of access regimes in determining users’ stewardship and suggest potential mechanisms for stewardship internalization.

中文翻译：

---

准入制度经验对小规模渔民管理行为的影响

在促进环境管理的前提下，越来越多地促进分配专有访问权以支持集体行动的治理机制来管理公共资源。然而，缺乏与支持这一前提的现有政策相关的实验证据。小型渔业中重叠的准入政策为测试准入制度对用户管理行为的影响提供了独特的机会。我们进行了实地实验室实验，以评估渔民以前在准入制度方面的经验与合规性和同行执法之间的关系（n= 120)。费舍尔的合规性和同行执法决策在公共资源博弈中进行了比较。处理方式不同，以代表排他访问和伪开放访问制度，渔民在现实生活中都面临这两种制度。为了将游戏中的行为与现实生活中的观察进行对比，我们比较了在独家访问政策下表现出相对较高和较低管理绩效的渔民协会。仅在现实生活中具有高管理绩效的渔民协会，排他准入处理下的合规性和同行执行率高于伪开放准入处理下。游戏中的行为反映了现实生活中联想之间的差异。