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Cybersecurity’s grammars: A more-than-human geopolitics of computation
Area ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-15 , DOI: 10.1111/area.12728
Andrew C Dwyer 1
Affiliation  

On one June afternoon in 2017, during an autoethnography of a malware analysis and detection laboratory, NotPetya quickly caused destruction. This malware has since been characterised as a key geopolitical event in cybersecurity, causing billions of dollars in damage as it rendered inoperable computers across the world. The hunt to identify those who had written NotPetya occurred almost immediately. However, this paper rearticulates this event through grammar, in a close reading of computation, to urge for a more-than-human reading of cybersecurity. By exploring the written propositions of the hackers, various computational materials – including hardware, code, and machine learning algorithms – as well as their ecologies, cybersecurity is understood to be part of an ecology of language-practice. Engaging with N. Katherine Hayles’ study of non-human cognition and choice, computation has an ability to read, interpret, and act, and thus intervene. NotPetya is thus not only a tool of hackers but is a political actor which, alongside others, transformed the contours of the geopolitics of cybersecurity. By focusing on grammars, geopolitics does not wholly derive from the (white, male, rational) hacker, analyst, or intelligence agent, but rather from a distributed set of actors that speak to one another. Grammars permit a nuanced appreciation of cyber-attacks, the hacker's handling of computational cognition and choice, as well as conceptualising the relation between author and computation and the risks of machine learning. Cybersecurity, through grammar, then becomes one of co-authorship where security is not only performed by humans but is contorted by an alien politics of computation.

中文翻译:

网络安全语法:超越人类的计算地缘政治学

2017 年 6 月的一个下午,在对恶意软件分析和检测实验室进行自动民族志调查时,NotPetya 迅速造成了破坏。此恶意软件已被定性为网络安全中的关键地缘政治事件,由于它导致世界各地的计算机无法运行,造成了数十亿美元的损失。几乎立即就开始寻找那些写过 NotPetya 的人。然而,本文在仔细阅读计算的过程中通过语法重新阐述了这一事件,以敦促对网络安全进行超越人类的阅读。通过探索黑客的书面命题、各种计算材料——包括硬件、代码和机器学习算法——以及它们的生态,网络安全被理解为语言实践生态的一部分。与N打交道 Katherine Hayles 对非人类认知和选择的研究,计算具有阅读、解释和行动的能力,从而进行干预。因此,NotPetya 不仅是黑客的工具,还是一个政治角色,与其他人一起改变了网络安全地缘政治的轮廓。通过关注语法,地缘政治并不完全源自(白人、男性、理性的)黑客、分析师或情报人员,而是源自一组分布式的相互交谈的参与者。语法允许对网络攻击、黑客处理计算认知和选择的细微差别,以及概念化作者和计算之间的关系以及机器学习的风险。网络安全,通过语法,
更新日期:2021-05-15
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