This article replies to Gila Stopler’s critique of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism. It argues that there are two strands in Stopler’s arguments. The first is Stopler’s critique of Political Liberalism for its accommodation of “right-wing populism.” This article argues that “right-wing populism” is not a “reasonable comprehensive view” under Rawls’s theory. Thus, Political Liberalism does not accommodate this view; it excludes it from the possibility of a reasonable overlapping consensus. The second strand in Stopler’s article can be interpreted as an invitation to think about the value of idealization in political theory. More concretely, this article argues that Stopler’s claims can be read as suggesting that political liberalism’s flaw is not that it tolerates illiberal views, but that it tells us little about how to achieve and maintain an overlapping consensus about justice in the kind of societies we actually inhabit. This article briefly argues that this critique deserves attention, especially given the circumstances of today’s societies, where extreme views are not uncommon and the effects of climate change threaten the very possibility of justice.

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右翼民粹主义、理想理论的合理性和局限性：对吉拉·斯托勒的答复

本文回应了 Gila Stopler 对约翰·罗尔斯的政治自由主义的批评。它认为斯托勒的论点有两个方面。首先是斯托勒对政治自由主义的批评，因为它迎合了“右翼民粹主义”。本文认为，“右翼民粹主义”并不是罗尔斯理论下的“合理综合观点”。因此，政治自由主义不接受这种观点；它排除了达成合理重叠共识的可能性。斯托勒文章中的第二条线索可以解释为邀请人们思考理想化在政治理论中的价值。更具体地说，本文认为，斯托勒的主张可以被解读为暗示政治自由主义的缺陷不在于它容忍非自由主义观点，但它几乎没有告诉我们如何在我们实际居住的那种社会中实现和维持关于正义的重叠共识。本文简要指出，这种批评值得关注，特别是考虑到当今社会的情况，极端观点并不少见，气候变化的影响威胁到正义的可能性。