We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.

我们开发了一种具有逆向选择和昂贵的信息获取激励的资产交换模型。资产的卖方知道资产的真实价值，而买方则可以以一定的成本获得有关资产质量的信息。均衡报价是汇集，但买方在产生有关资产质量的昂贵信息后只能购买优质资产。当卖方持有好资产的概率高于阈值时，根据信息获取成本，有无信息获取都可能发生交易，没有信息生产的均衡下的交易量和社会福利高于有信息生产的均衡。信息生产。当面临好资产的概率低于阈值时，只有在筛选资产质量后才会进行交易，因此，如果信息获取成本足够高，市场就会崩溃。随着信息获取成本的增加，社会福利会根据面临好坏资产的概率增加或减少。