We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm's decisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot–Walras equilibrium of an economy where each firm maximizes a share‐weighted average of shareholder utilities—rendering the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one‐sector economy, if returns to scale are non‐increasing, then an increase in “effective” market concentration (which accounts for common ownership) leads to declines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Yet when there are multiple sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common ownership could stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We characterize for which ownership structures the monopolistically competitive limit or an oligopolistic one is attained as the number of sectors in the economy increases. When firms have heterogeneous constant returns to scale technologies, we find that an increase in common ownership leads to markets that are more concentrated.

中文翻译：

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一般均衡寡头和所有权结构

我们建立了一个易于处理的一般均衡框架，在该框架中，公司规模较大，并且在产品和劳动力方面都具有市场支配力，并且公司的决定会受到其所有权结构的影响。我们描述了一个经济体的古诺-瓦尔拉斯均衡，在这种均衡中，每家公司都会最大化股东公用事业的加权加权平均数，从而使该均衡与价格正常化无关。在单部门经济中，如果规模回报不增加，那么“有效”市场集中度的提高（占共同所有权）将导致就业，实际工资和劳动份额的下降。但是，当存在多个部门时，由于部门间的金钱外部性，当劳动力供给的弹性相对于产品市场的替代弹性较高时，共同所有权的增加会刺激经济。我们描述了随着经济中部门数量的增加，对于哪种所有权结构会形成垄断性竞争限制或达到寡头垄断的限制。当公司在规模化技术方面获得不同的固定回报时，我们发现普通所有权的增加会导致市场更加集中。