We characterize optimal asset management contracts in a classic portfolio‐investment setting. When the agent has access to hidden savings, his incentives to misbehave depend on his precautionary saving motive. The contract dynamically distorts the agent's access to capital to manipulate his precautionary saving motive and reduce incentives for misbehavior. We provide a sufficient condition for the validity of the first‐order approach, which holds in the optimal contract: global incentive compatibility is ensured if the agent's precautionary saving motive weakens after bad outcomes. We extend our results to incorporate market risk, hidden investment, and renegotiation.

中文翻译：

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具有隐藏储蓄的最优资产管理合同

我们以经典的投资组合设置最佳资产管理合同的特征。当代理人获得隐性储蓄时，其行为不当的动机取决于其预防性储蓄动机。合同动态地扭曲了代理人获得资本的渠道，从而操纵了他的预防性储蓄动机，并减少了不良行为的诱因。我们为一阶方法的有效性提供了充分的条件，该一阶方法适用于最优合同：如果代理人的预防性储蓄动机在不良结果之后减弱，则可以确保全局激励兼容性。我们将结果扩展到包括市场风险，隐性投资和重新谈判。