A profit‐maximizing seller has a single unit of a good to sell. The bidders have a pure common value that is drawn from a distribution that is commonly known. The seller does not know the bidders' beliefs about the value and thinks that beliefs are designed adversarially by Nature to minimize profit. We construct a strong maxmin solution to this joint mechanism design and information design problem, consisting of a mechanism, an information structure, and an equilibrium, such that neither the seller nor Nature can move profit in their respective preferred directions, even if the deviator can select the new equilibrium. The mechanism and information structure solve a family of maxmin mechanism design and minmax information design problems, regardless of how an equilibrium is selected. The maxmin mechanism takes the form of a proportional auction: each bidder submits a one‐dimensional bid, the aggregate allocation and aggregate payment depend on the aggregate bid, and individual allocations and payments are proportional to bids. We report a number of additional properties of the maxmin mechanisms, including what happens as the number of bidders grows large and robustness with respect to the prior over the value.

中文翻译：

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具有共同价值的最优拍卖设计：一种信息稳健的方法

利润最大化的卖方只能出售一件商品。投标人具有从公知的分布中得出的纯共同价值。卖方不了解投标人对价值的信念，并认为这些信念是自然界进行对抗性设计的，目的是最大程度地减少利润。我们构建强大的maxmin解决方案这个共同的机制设计和信息设计问题，由一个机制，一个信息结构和一个均衡组成，因此即使偏离者可以选择新的均衡，卖方和自然也无法向各自的首选方向移动利润。该机制和信息结构解决了一系列maxmin机制设计和minmax信息设计问题，而与如何选择平衡无关。maxmin机制采用比例拍卖的形式：每个投标人都提交一维投标，总分配和总付款取决于总投标，并且各个分配和付款与投标成比例。我们报告了maxmin机制的许多其他属性，包括随着竞标者数量的增加以及相对于先验价值的稳健性而发生的情况。