The conventional wisdom in ethics is that pure moral laws are at least metaphysically necessary. By contrast, Moral Contingentism holds that pure moral laws are metaphysically contingent, and at most normatively necessary. This paper raises a normative objection to Moral Contingentism: it is worse equipped than Moral Necessitarianism to account for the normative standing or authority of the pure moral laws to govern the lives of the agents to whom they apply. Since morality is widely taken to have such a standing, failing to account for it would be a significant problem. The objection also shows that the debate about the modal status of moral principles isn't a debate solely within modal metaphysics, but has implications for topics in moral philosophy.

中文翻译：

---

反对道德偶然性

伦理学中的传统智慧是，纯粹的道德法则至少在形而上学上是必要的。相比之下，道德或然主义认为纯粹的道德法则在形而上学上是偶然的，至多在规范上是必要的。这篇论文对道德或然主义提出了一个规范性反对意见：它比道德必然主义更难解释纯粹道德法则的规范地位或权威，以管理它们所适用的代理人的生活。由于道德被广泛认为具有这样的地位，不考虑它将是一个重大问题。反对意见还表明，关于道德原则的模态地位的辩论不仅仅是模态形而上学的辩论，而且对道德哲学的主题也有影响。