Two proofs are given which show that if some set of truths fall under finitely many concepts (so-called ), then they all fall under at least one of them even if we do not know which one. Examples are given in which the result seems paradoxical. The first proof crucially involves Moorean propositions while the second is a reconstruction and generalization of a proof due to Humberstone free from any reference to such propositions. We survey a few solution routes including Tennant-style restriction strategies. It is concluded that accepting for some set of truths while also denying that any of the involved concepts in isolation capture all of them requires that one of these concepts cannot be closed under conjunction elimination. This is surprising since the paper surveys several applications in which and the latter closure condition seemed jointly satisfiable for concepts of actual philosophical interest.

中文翻译：

---

收集真相：两种形式的悖论

给出了两个证明，表明如果一组真理属于有限多个概念（所谓的），那么即使我们不知道是哪一个，它们也都属于其中至少一个。给出了结果似乎自相矛盾的例子。第一个证明关键地涉及摩尔命题，而第二个证明是对亨伯斯通的证明的重构和概括，没有任何对此类命题的引用。我们调查了一些解决方案路线，包括 Tennant 式限制策略。得出的结论是，接受某些真理，同时否认任何所涉及的概念孤立地捕获了所有真理，这要求这些概念中的一个不能在连词消除下关闭。这是令人惊讶的，因为该论文调查了几个应用程序，其中对于具有实际哲学兴趣的概念，后一种封闭条件似乎可以共同满足。