ABSTRACT

Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker’s concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson’s account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.

摘要

认知上的不公正是代理人作为知识分子可能遭受的错误。在这篇文章中，我提供了一种我称之为预期认知不公正的现象的概念化，我声称这是一种独特且特别有害的认知不公正，值得独立分析。我认为预期的认知不公正在于代理人可能因预期而遭受的错误他们在接受证词分享机会的过程中遇到的挑战。我将我的叙述与认知不公正的范式案例区分开来，例如米兰达·弗里克 (Miranda Fricker) 的证词不公正和解释学不公正的概念；此外，我将我的观点与 Kristie Dotson 对证词扼杀的描述不同。我认为，最终，预期的认知不公正是对我们当前的认知不公正分类的有用补充，因为它对一系列非标准的认知不公正案例具有有希望的解释潜力。