This article investigates the conditions under which regulatees challenge regulatory sanctions in court. Targets of enforcement have the right to make independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) accountable in court, but IRAs would prefer not to have their enforcement actions challenged. This article argues that, when deciding whether to contest regulators through appeals, regulatees consider the price of harming the regulatory relationship. Regulatory litigation is expected to be shaped by the type of enforcement measures at stake, the type of entity (i.e., firm or individual), and the kind of relation between firms and authorities (i.e., primary regulators). The empirical analysis relies on more than 3,700 cases from 18 financial regulators covering 13 European countries between 2004 and 2020. Results suggest that enforcement actions that impose costlier sanctions and target individuals are at higher risk of appeal; in contrast, firms sanctioned by their national primary regulators show less appetite for appeals.

中文翻译：

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挑战监管者：金融监管中的执法和上诉

本文调查了受监管者在法庭上质疑监管制裁的条件。执法目标有权要求独立监管机构 (IRA) 在法庭上承担责任，但 IRA 不希望其执法行动受到质疑。本文认为，在决定是否通过上诉与监管者抗衡时，监管者会考虑损害监管关系的代价。监管诉讼预计将受到所涉执法措施类型、实体类型（即公司或个人）以及公司与当局之间的关系类型（即主要监管机构）的影响。实证分析依赖于 2004 年至 2020 年间来自 13 个欧洲国家的 18 个金融监管机构的 3,700 多个案例。结果表明，实施更昂贵的制裁和针对个人的执法行动具有更高的上诉风险；相比之下，受到国家一级监管机构制裁的公司对上诉的兴趣较小。