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Why Disclose Less Information? Toward Resolving a Disclosure Puzzle in the Housing Market
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics ( IF 1.480 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-13 , DOI: 10.1007/s11146-021-09824-6
Xun Bian , Justin C. Contat , Bennie D. Waller , Scott A. Wentland

We examine the role of information disclosure in the housing market, offering both theory and evidence for observed variability in disclosure strategies among property listings in a multiple listing service (MLS). Our initial empirical findings and the theoretical literature suggest a positive link between information disclosure (e.g., number of photos) and marketing outcomes (e.g., sale price, liquidity). While intuitive, it raises an interesting puzzle: why then do some agents disclose less information? Analytically, we show that it can be optimal to omit information in some circumstances, particularly when homes are more heterogeneous or have greater scope for taste-specific attributes. Empirically, the data support the prediction that less information disclosure is beneficial for a large subsample of properties (i.e., high-end homes). Our results also reveal scope for new principal-agent issues, as agents generally disclose less when they market their own homes, and even less for their higher-end homes when it is a more optimal strategy.



中文翻译:

为什么要披露较少的信息?解决住房市场的披露难题

我们研究了信息披露在房地产市场中的作用,为多元上市服务(MLS)中房地产清单之间的披露策略中观察到的变化提供了理论和证据。我们的初步经验发现和理论文献表明,信息披露(例如照片数量)与营销成果(例如销售价格,流动性)之间存在正相关关系。虽然直观,但却引出了一个有趣的难题:为什么某些特工没有那么多地披露信息?从分析上看,我们表明在某些情况下,最好是省略信息,特别是在房屋种类更多或具有特定口味属性的范围更大的情况下。从经验上讲,数据支持以下预测:较少的信息披露对大量的房地产子样本(即高端房屋)有利。我们的结果还揭示了新的委托代理问题的范围,因为代理在出售自己的房屋时通常只披露较少的信息,而在采用最佳策略时,其高端房屋所披露的信息甚至更少。

更新日期:2021-05-13
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