A growing body of literature shows that full-cooperation among farmers to manage productive ecosystem services would yield gains with respect to uncoordinated approaches. The public good feature of these ecosystem services may, however, hinder the emergence of a cooperative solution at the landscape scale. In this paper, we introduce in a coalition formation game a spatially-explicit bioeconomic model of fruit pollination, where pollinaton depends on the distance to the choosen location of natural habitats. We analyse: (i) which coalitions are stable; (ii) what benefits they provide; (iii) how cooperation depends on the initial landscape structure; and (iv) how policy instruments affect cooperation. The theoretical model presents the rationality of cooperation but, due to the detailed heterogeneity and complex spatial interactions among farms, we use a numerical example to determine the stable coalitions. We find that only small coalitions are stable and that the benefits of cooperation decrease when the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers increase. Policy instruments can increase the interest for cooperation but per-hectare payments and minimum participation rules may reduce the habitat area at the margin (by decreasing the stability of coalitions). Price premium for the coalition members increase the habitat area but its budget-effectiveness decreases as the spatial autocorrelation of fruit tree covers increase.

越来越多的文献表明，农民之间在管理生产性生态系统服务方面的全面合作将在不协调的方法方面产生收益。但是，这些生态系统服务的公共利益特征可能会阻碍在景观尺度上出现合作解决方案。在本文中，我们在联盟形成博弈中引入了空间授粉的水果授粉生物经济模型，其中传粉取决于到自然栖息地选择位置的距离。我们分析：（i）哪些联盟是稳定的；（ii）他们提供什么好处；（iii）合作如何取决于最初的景观结构；（iv）政策手段如何影响合作。该理论模型提出了合作的合理性，但是由于农场之间详细的异质性和复杂的空间互动，我们使用一个数值示例来确定稳定的联盟。我们发现，只有较小的联盟是稳定的，并且当果树覆盖的空间自相关增加时，合作的收益会降低。政策手段可以增加合作的兴趣，但是每公顷的支付和最低参与规则可能会减少边缘地区的栖息地面积（通过降低联盟的稳定性）。联盟成员的价格溢价增加了栖息地的面积，但随着果树覆盖物的空间自相关增加，其预算效力下降。政策手段可以增加合作的兴趣，但是每公顷的支付和最低参与规则可能会减少边缘地区的栖息地面积（通过降低联盟的稳定性）。联盟成员的价格溢价增加了栖息地的面积，但随着果树覆盖物的空间自相关增加，其预算效力下降。政策手段可以增加合作的兴趣，但是每公顷的支付和最低参与规则可能会减少边缘的栖息地（通过降低联盟的稳定性）。联盟成员的价格溢价增加了栖息地的面积，但随着果树覆盖物的空间自相关增加，其预算效力下降。