ABSTRACT

In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgments. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one’s moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgments express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence—the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same object—can play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgments. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view—deciding how to act under moral ambivalence.

摘要

在许多情况下，人们不确定自己的道德判断。在最近的许多哲学文献中，这种道德怀疑已经根据一个人的道德信仰的不确定性进行了分析。然而，非认知主义者认为，道德判断表达了一种主动态度，更像是一种欲望而不是一种信念。本文提出了对非认知主义和道德怀疑的科学调和。核心主张是态度矛盾——一个人对同一对象持有冲突态度的程度——可以对非认知主义者起到道德怀疑的作用。我将证明矛盾心理具有我们期望它具有的所有特征，以便扮演道德怀疑的角色。它是可分级的，可以随时间而变化，与动力强度共同变化，并且适当地区别于我们道德判断的其他特征。除了为非认知主义提供辩护之外，这种见解还对这种观点提出了新的挑战——决定如何在道德矛盾的情况下采取行动。