In this paper, I show that David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism leads to a dilemma. In Chapter 2 of his book Better Never to Have Been, Benatar claims that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits that explains four prevalent asymmetries. Based on the axiological asymmetry, he defends the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. The four prevalent asymmetries to be explained are moral duties, reasons, attitudes, or feelings concerning life as a whole. However, Benatar explains them by applying the axiological asymmetry to parts of life, such as pains and pleasures. I find a serious gap here. While two ways are available to bridge this gap, a dilemma arises from Benatar’s asymmetry argument. The axiological asymmetry is not supported because it cannot explain the four prevalent asymmetries, or else it cannot lead to the anti-natalist conclusion. A number of philosophers have already criticized Benatar’s asymmetry argument, mainly questioning its assumptions. In this paper, I contend that there is no good reason to agree with his argument even if all its explicit assumptions are accepted.

在本文中，我证明了大卫·贝纳塔尔（David Benatar）反对反纳粹主义的不对称论点导致了两难选择。在他的著作《永远不要变得更好》的第2章中，贝纳塔尔（Benatar）声称，伤害与收益之间存在着价值不对称的现象，可以解释四种普遍的不对称现象。基于价值论的不对称性，他捍卫了反对我们的观点，即我们不应该生育孩子。要解释的四个普遍的不对称是道德责任，理由，态度或与整体生活有关的感觉。但是，贝纳塔尔（Benatar）通过将价值不对称性应用于生活的各个部分（例如痛苦和愉悦）来对其进行解释。我在这里发现严重的差距。尽管有两种方法可以弥合这种差距，但贝纳塔尔的不对称论点却产生了两难选择。不支持价值论不对称性，因为它不能解释四个普遍存在的不对称性，否则就无法得出反犹太主义的结论。许多哲学家已经批评了Benatar的不对称论点，主要是质疑其假设。在本文中，我认为，即使接受了所有明确的假设，也没有充分的理由同意他的观点。