Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open access. We modeled a recreational harvest fishery in which local or centralized managers invest in fish stocking to maximize social welfare. Although classic open access dissipation of rents occurs at equilibrium, the sluggish response of fishing effort to changing conditions allows welfare to accrue in transition to equilibrium. This transient welfare creates persistent incentives to invest. Empirical observations showed that stocking by local collective action groups occurred at rates similar to model-predicted optima, while centralized stocking occurred at rates greater than predicted optima. Our results emphasize the potential benefits of local involvement in managing the commons, even under conditions that were previously thought to preclude effective collective action.

中文翻译：

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投资公地：尽管开放获取，但短暂的福利仍会产生激励

本地用户可以投资于管理公共池资源，从而提高社会和生态适应力。准入的制度或经济限制被认为是激励本地投资的必要前提，但我们证明，即使在开放准入条件下，投资激励措施也可以存在。我们对休闲性捕捞渔业进行了建模，在这种捕捞渔业中，地方或中央管理人员投资于鱼类资源以最大程度地提高社会福利。尽管经典的开放获取租金在平衡时发生耗散，但是捕捞努力对变化的条件的反应缓慢，使得福利在向平衡过渡的过程中积累了下来。这种短暂的福利创造了持续的投资动机。经验观察表明，当地集体行动小组的备货速度与模型预测的最优速度相似，而集中库存的发生率大于预期的最佳值。我们的结果强调了即使在以前被认为无法采取有效集体行动的条件下，地方参与管理公地的潜在利益。