The background target of the research going into the present article is to forge an intellectual alliance between, on the one hand, active inference and the free-energy principle (FEP), and on the other, Charles S. Peirce’s theory of semiotics and pragmatism. In the present paper, the focus is on the allegiance between the nomenclatures of active and abductive inferences as the proper place to begin reaching at that wider target. The paper outlines the key conceptual elements involved in a naturalistic rendering of Peirce’s late semiotic and logical notion of abductive reasoning. The target is a cognitive-biological model of abduction which preserves the functional integrity of an organism and fulfils the existential imperative for living beings’ evidence of existence. Such a model is an adaptation of Peirce’s late logical schema of abduction proposed in his largely unpublished works during the early 20th century. The proposed model is argued to be a feasible sketch also of recent breakthroughs in computational (sensu Bayesian) cognitive science.

本文研究的背景目标是，一方面建立积极的推理与自由能原理（FEP）之间的思想联盟，另一方面建立查尔斯·皮尔斯的符号学和实用主义理论。在本文中，重点是主动和外在名词之间的效忠。推断是开始达到该更广泛目标的适当位置。本文概述了皮尔斯的归纳推理后期符号学和逻辑概念的自然主义渲染所涉及的关键概念要素。目标是绑架的认知生物学模型，该模型保留了有机体的功能完整性，并满足了生物存在的生存要求。这样的模型是对皮尔斯在20世纪初期他大部分未发表的作品中提出的绑架晚期逻辑图式的改编。该模型被认为是可行的草图，也是计算（认知贝叶斯）认知科学的最新突破。