Over the past few years, scholarly interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been increasing. However, research on the relationship between CSR and firm performance has revealed a complicated relationship. In this paper, we argue that part of the basis for the generally positive relationship between CSR and firm performance might come from a reduction in agency costs. Relying on behavioral agency theory, we construct a model in which CSR moderates the impact of the agency problem on specific firm outcomes, including firm performance, the use of stock options, and goodwill. Based on panel data of publicly traded U.S. firms from 1999 to 2013, we find support for that model. These findings suggest the role of CSR in improving corporate governance efficiency through mitigating agency problems inside the firm.

中文翻译：

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企业社会责任如何激励高层管理人员：作为机构干预的可持续发展承诺

在过去的几年里，学术界对企业社会责任 (CSR) 的兴趣一直在增加。然而，对企业社会责任与企业绩效之间关系的研究揭示了一种复杂的关系。在本文中，我们认为 CSR 与公司绩效之间普遍存在正相关关系的部分基础可能来自代理成本的降低。依靠行为代理理论，我们构建了一个模型，其中 CSR 调节代理问题对特定公司结果的影响，包括公司绩效、股票期权的使用和商誉。基于 1999 年至 2013 年美国上市公司的面板数据，我们发现了对该模型的支持。这些发现表明 CSR 在通过减轻公司内部的代理问题来提高公司治理效率方面的作用。