Cavenaile et al. (2021) study the long-run implications of anti-trust policy for innovation, output and welfare using a general equilibrium model. Their approach differs from the much of the existing literature that focuses on short-run, partial equilibrium effects. Their model combines three key elements: (i) endogenous growth with vertical innovations; (ii) oligopolistic competition in the product market; (iii) endogenous M&As. I will briefly discuss their paper and then compare it to Mermelstein et al. (2020) who also study optimal merger policy in a dynamic model.

中文翻译：

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讨论“反垄断政策对增长和福利的动态影响”

Cavenaile 等人。(2021) 使用一般均衡模型研究反垄断政策对创新、产出和福利的长期影响。他们的方法不同于现有的许多关注短期、部分均衡效应的文献。他们的模型结合了三个关键要素：(i) 垂直创新的内生增长；(ii) 产品市场的寡头竞争；(iii) 内生性并购。我将简要讨论他们的论文，然后将其与 Mermelstein 等人进行比较。(2020) 谁也在动态模型中研究最优合并政策。