This paper studies the conduct of monetary policy in economies with currency mismatch. To this end, I build a model that embeds financial frictions from households' collateralized borrowing in foreign currency into an open-economy Keynesian framework. The monetary authority faces a trade-off between traditional unemployment stabilization gains from currency depreciation and its costs in terms of generating debt deflation and tightening households' ability to borrow. The optimal policy under this trade-off results in macroeconomic patterns aligned with those observed in emerging-markets data, including large currency depreciation and consumption adjustments during crises. The optimal degree of “fear of floating” depends on the level of indebtedness with which the economy arrives to a crisis and on the type of experienced by the economy.

本文研究了货币错配经济体的货币政策行为。为此，我构建了一个模型，将家庭外币抵押借款的金融摩擦嵌入到开放经济凯恩斯主义框架中。货币当局面临着货币贬值带来的传统失业稳定收益与其在产生债务通缩和收紧家庭借贷能力方面的成本之间的权衡。这种权衡下的最佳政策导致宏观经济模式与新兴市场数据中观察到的模式一致，包括货币大幅贬值和危机期间的消费调整。“对浮动的恐惧”的最佳程度取决于经济陷入危机的债务水平以及经济所经历的类型。