Central banks play an important role in the economy. They are responsible for the conduct of monetary policy, and in several countries, they get involved in the supervision of the financial sector. We derive a simple theoretical model to illustrate how culture may influence a politician's choice of regulatory architecture and the assignment of responsibilities when anticipating the impact of that regime on the regulatory agencies’ incentives to cooperate. Using a sample of around 70 countries during the period 1996–2013 we confirm that the extent of supervisory duties that are allocated to the central bank are influenced by national culture. More specifically, consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that individualism is positively associated, and power distance is negatively associated, with the likelihood of higher central bank involvement in supervision.

中央银行在经济中发挥着重要作用。他们负责货币政策的执行，在一些国家，他们参与金融部门的监管。我们推导出一个简单的理论模型来说明在预测该制度对监管机构合作动机的影响时，文化如何影响政治家对监管架构的选择和责任分配。使用1996-2013年期间约70个国家的样本，我们确认分配给中央银行的监管职责的程度受国家文化的影响。更具体地说，与理论预测一致，我们发现个人主义是正相关的，而权力距离是负相关的，