ABSTRACT

The Israeli Moshavim were agricultural cooperative associations grouped into regional procurement associations, operated under a mechanism of joint liability lending until the 1985 debt-crisis. Unique historical financial-panel-data offers behavioural insights into the joint liability group lending, through constructing Moshavim’s Debt-To-Output (DTO) ratio distribution. The right-tailed exponential distribution captures the finding that a small portion of the Moshavim were debtors. A semi-parametric model synthesises between the debtors and the creditors. While a joint liability mechanism might boost risk-receptiveness and excessive optimism concerning the peer’s accountability for some, it carries a reversed effect for others. Thus, the failure of the mechanism might be unavoidable.

摘要

以色列Moshavim是农业合作社协会，分为区域采购协会，在共同责任贷款机制下运作，直到1985年债务危机。通过构建Moshavim的债务对产出（DTO）比率分布，独特的历史财务面板数据提供了对联合负债组贷款的行为洞察力。右尾指数分布表明，Moshavim的一小部分是债务人。债务人和债权人之间的半参数模型综合在一起。尽管共同责任机制可能会提高风险承受能力，并且对同伴对某些人的问责制过于乐观，但对其他人却产生了相反的影响。因此，该机制的失败可能是不可避免的。