We study the economic analysis of a single server Markovian queueing system with positive and negative customers and multiple working vacations. Both positive and negative customers arrive in the system according to a Poisson process. Upon arrival, positive customers acquire some system information and decide whether to join or to balk the system based on the acquired information and a linear cost-reward structure. Negative customers on arrival break the server and kill the positive customer in service. The server is immediately sent for repair, and no customers are allowed during a repair. The server takes multiple working vacations after serving all the positive waiting customers. We obtain the equilibrium strategies and social benefit of positive customers under four different information situations. Numerical experiments are presented to show the effects of model parameters and information levels on the equilibrium joining behavior of positive customers.

我们研究具有正负客户和多个工作休假的单服务器马尔可夫排队系统的经济分析。正客户和负客户都根据泊松过程进入系统。到达后，积极的客户会获取一些系统信息，并根据所获取的信息和线性成本奖励结构来决定是否加入或拒绝该系统。到达目的地时，负面客户破坏了服务器并杀死了服务中的正面客户。服务器将立即送去维修，并且在维修过程中不允许客户入内。在为所有积极等待的客户提供服务之后，服务器将进行多个工作假期。在四种不同的信息情况下，我们获得了积极客户的均衡策略和社会效益。