The originate-to-distribute (OTD) model, in which the originators of mortgages sell or securitize the mortgages to third parties, likely contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. Auditors were blamed for permitting clients to understate the risks of the model in their financial reports, fostering undisciplined lending. We investigate whether public audit oversight influences OTD lending by promoting more vigilant audits of the financial reports of originators. Using a difference-in-differences design prior to the financial crisis, we find reduced OTD lending by banks after the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) criticizes their auditors’ audits of financial reports regarding OTD transactions. The reduction is greater for banks with poorer risk controls and stronger incentives to manage earnings. We also find a reduction in gains on loan sales and securitizations. The results suggest that PCAOB inspections can help discipline OTD lending, a real effect of public audit oversight in the United States.

抵押贷款发起人将抵押贷款出售或证券化给第三方的起源到分配 (OTD) 模式可能导致了 2008 年的金融危机。审计师被指责允许客户在财务报告中低估该模型的风险，助长了无纪律的贷款。我们通过促进对发起人财务报告的更加警惕的审计来调查公共审计监督是否会影响 OTD 贷款。使用金融危机之前的差异设计，我们发现在上市公司会计监督委员会 (PCAOB) 批评其审计师对有关 OTD 交易的财务报告的审计后，银行的 OTD 贷款减少了。对于风险控制较差且收益管理动机较强的银行而言，降幅更大。我们还发现贷款销售和证券化收益减少。结果表明，PCAOB 的检查可以帮助规范 OTD 贷款，这是美国公共审计监督的真实效果。