Semanticists often restrict their theories by imposing constraints on the parameters that can be employed for interpreting the expressions of a language. Such constraints are based on non-logical features of actual contexts of utterance, but they often have important effects on issues that do pertain to logic, like analyticity or entailment. For example, Kaplan’s restriction to so-called “proper contexts” was required in order to count “I am here now” as valid. In this paper I argue that constraints of this kind are often posited in an arbitrary and non-consistent way, and that they yield the intended results only at the price of imposing ad hoc principles whose justification could in turn justify further, often undesirable restrictions into the theory. I also introduce a criterion for telling whether such constraints are imposed in a legitimate manner.

中文翻译：

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关于如何合理限制语义理论

语义学家常常通过对可用于解释语言表达的参数施加约束来限制其理论。此类约束基于话语实际上下文的非逻辑特征，但是它们通常会对确实与逻辑有关的问题（如分析性或蕴含性）产生重要影响。例如，为了将“我现在在这里”视为有效，就要求卡普兰限制所谓的“适当的环境”。在本文中，我认为这类约束通常以任意和非一致的方式提出，并且它们只能以强加临时性原则为代价来产生预期的结果，而临时性原则的合理性反过来又可以进一步证明合理性，通常是不受欢迎的限制。理论。